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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a model of smuggling consistent with the 
coexistence of firms involved in strictly legal trade with firms 
involved in smuggling. A framework is presented in which a 
firm's degree of risk aversion and the level of government 
enforcement are the determining factors in the decision of the 
firm to smuggle or not to smuggle. The model demonstrates that 
smuggling must be welfare enhancing or all smuggling activity 
will end. 
This paper also provides a theoretical analysis of the 
effect enforcement has on smuggling and welfare. Increased 
enforcement is shown to have a negative effect on welfare. 
Government enforcement is assumed to have two policy instruments 
it can use to combat smuggling: 1) the probability of detection; 
2) the monetary penalty. The relative effectiveness of 
government enforcement instruments in deterring smuggling is 
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SMUGGLING AND PARALLEL MARKETS FOR EXPORTS 
by 
Scott w. Fausti 
Introduction 
The literature on illegal transactions suggest that 
smuggling may reduce welfare over the non-smuggling situation. 
In this essay a model of firm behavior is developed which allows 
smuggling to be a viable option in addition to legal trade for 
the domestic firm involved in international trade. The results 
of the "parallel market" model developed in this essay indicate 
that if smuggling is not welfare enhancing, regardless of the 
real resource cost, smuggling will end. In addition, the 
parallel market model allows the effect of government enforcement 
on smuggling to be examined. The model demonstrates that 
increased enforcement has a negative impact on smuggling and, 
more importantly, a negative impact on welfare. 
The seminal paper on illegal transactions by Bhagwati and 
Hansen (1973) analyzed the welfare implications of smuggling for 
a small country that imposed a non-prohibitive tariff on imports. 
Their analysis produced two substantive results. First, under the 
assumption of perfect competition in the domestic market for 
imports and the presence of a domestic price differential between 
legal and illegal goods, illegal trade will dominate the domestic 
market for imports. In this case a unique welfare ranking is not 
possible. 1 Second, when it was assumed illegal goods sell at 
the full duty domestic price, legal and illegal trade coexist in 
the domestic market. The presence of smuggling, however, has a 
negative effect on welfare. Bhagwati and Hansen's results cast 
doubt on the widely held view that smuggling improves welfare in 
that it constitutes a partial or total evasion of welfare 
reducing tariffs. 2 
One weakness of the Bhagwati and Hansen model is its 
inability to sustain both legal and illegal trade when the 
domestic price of illegal imports is below the theoretical full 
duty price for imports. In the real world, legal and illegal 
trade coexist, with the domestic price of imports being below 
what the theoretical full duty price should be. 
2 
Empirical evidence validating this phenomena is provided by 
Richard Cooper's (1974) empirical study of import smuggling in 
Indonesia. Cooper examined the effect of smuggling on the 
wholesale market price of goods subject to varying tariff levels. 
Cooper's results revealed that the average wholesale market price 
of a good subjected to a tariff was only 82% of what the good's 
tariff inclusive price should be. This result was for goods with 
a tariff rate of 0% to 100%. For goods that were subject to 
tariffs of 100% to 200%, only 39% of the tariff increment above 
100% was reflected in the average wholesale price. An increase 
in tariff rates above 258% resulted in a actual reduction in the 
average wholesale price. 3 
The first theoretical paper focusing on the domestic price 
effect of smuggling was published by Pitt (1981) . Pitt developed 
a model of export smuggling based on a smuggling production 
function for firms that use legal export trade as a cover for 
their illegal export trade. For the smuggling firm, legal and 
illegal exports become a joint product of the firm. The average 
price of the joint export product is greater than the price of 
exports in the non-smuggling situation. Price disparity is a 
term Pitt coined for the empirically valid phenomenon of exports 
selling above their theoretical full duty domestic price.4 
Pitt's model demonstrates that price disparity and the 
coexistence of legal and illegal trade are possible. Pitt 
obtains this result because all firms in his model smuggle and 
legal and illegal exports are joint products of exporting firms. 
Pitt's model, however, incorporates passive government 
enforcement and lacks a decision process to explain of why one 
firm will smuggle and another will not. These characteristics of 
Pitt's model produce smuggling•s ambiguous welfare effect when 
smuggling incurs a real resource cost. 
3 
Martin and Panagariya (1984) introduced the crime theoretic 
approach to the analysis of import smuggling. This approach 
explicitly allows them to incorporate the uncertainty associated 
with smuggling. As in the Pitt model, however, their analysis 
fails to provide an explanation of why one firm will smuggle and 
another will not. The strong assumptions of firm risk 
neutrality, that all import firms smuggle, and that the smuggling 
firm sets its own probability of detection generate their 
ambiguous welfare results. 
The three major goals of this essay are: 1) to develop a 
model that allows varying degrees of firm risk aversion to exist 
4 
in the export industry; 2) to provide an analysis of the 
interaction effect of varying degrees of firm risk aversion with 
different levels of government enforcement on total smuggling and 
a country's social welfare; 3) to present a general explanation 
of the coexistence of firms involved in legal trade only with 
firms that smuggle when there is a tax wedge driven between the 
world and domestic price of a good. 
For the convenience of the reader an outline of the essay is 
provided. Section (2) develops the Pitt model of smuggling. A 
set of modifying assumptions are then introduced which allows the 
formal development of the parallel market model in the next 
section. Section (3) formally develops the parallel market model 
and then analyzes the welfare implications of the interaction 
effect between the risk associated with smuggling and the 
existence of parallel markets for exports. Section (4) examines 
the role of government enforcement policy and its effect on 
social welfare in the parallel market model. Section (5) gives a 
summary of the results and discusses the policy implications of 
those results. 
Assumptions 
The analysis begins with the Pitt model of smuggling. 
Pitt's basic model represents the small country case with the 
terms of trade fixed. The country produces two traded goods, (X) 
and (M) , an exportable and importable, respectively, with primary 
factors in perfect competition. Production and trade are carried 
out by identical exporting firms. Legal and illegal trade in 
exports is carried out by the same firm. All firms smuggle in 
the Pitt model, and the law of one price holds in the domestic 
economy. 
It is assumed each firm can trade illegally according to 
"Pitt's smuggling function", 
(1) s* = G (L,S) . 
5 
The term (S*) is the quantity of good (X) smuggled, (L) is 
the quantity of good (X) legally traded and (S) is the quantity 
of good (X) input into smuggling activity. The function (G) is 
strictly concave and a twice differentiable linear homogenous 
function. The function (G) is also assumed to have the following 
properties: 
( 2) GL � 0, 
(3) 1 � Gs � 0, 
c 4) s - s* � o. 
Assumption (2) states that the marginal product of legal 
trade used in smuggling is non-negative. Assumption (3) states 
that a unit increase in the smuggling input (S) results in a 
positive, but less than or equal to, unit increase in actual ex­
post smuggling. Assumption (4) prohibits the cost of smuggling 
from being negative. Pitt assumes the difference between ex-ante 
smuggling (S) and ex-post smuggling, (s*) , consists of penalties 
and confiscation or a mixture of real resource cost, penalties, 
and confiscation. 
The following assumptions are now made in order to transform 
the Pitt model into the parallel market model of smuggling: 1) 
6 
smuggling by firms may not impose a real cost on society; 5 2) 
firms have utility functions with respect to profits that exhibit 
Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility properties; 3) smugglers 
(firms) are natives and, therefore, their utility functions are 
embodied in the country's social welfare function; 4) export 
taxes are assumed to be non-prohibitive; 5) all firms in the 
domestic export industry exhibit diminishing returns in 
production, which implies (U) shaped average cost curves; 6) 
firms must bear the risk of illegal activity and they can not 
insure against criminal penalties; and 7) if the domestic 
exporting firm decides to smuggle, it will then produce a joint 
product, and legal trade will act as a cloak for the firm's 
illegal activity. The firm can use four methods to smuggle 
exports: a) clandestine smuggling of exports; b) under-invoicing 
of exports; c) falsely declared exports; d) under-assessment of 
exports. 
I assume that the difference between (S) and (S*) is a real 
resource cost coming from either an excess transport cost 
associated with illegal trade or from evasion tactics used to 
escape detection. 6 The evasion cost is due to cloaking 
activities used by smugglers to reduce the expected value of 
punishment: µ= (P•F) . The variable (P) is the probability of 
detection. The variable (F) is the monetary penalty. Smugglers 
use cloaking activities to decrease the value of (P) to less than 
one. Without cloaking activities, it is assumed (P) will be 
equal to one for the smuggling firm. Therefore, it is assumed 
7 
the expected value of punishment has a positive relationship with 
the real resource cost associated with cloaking activities. 
Hence, the smuggling function G (S, L;µ) is assumed to have the 
following properties with respect to the exogenous variable (µ), 
G'<O, G"<O. 
The analysis in the next section begins by assuming that 
smuggling does not incur a real cost over legal trade, i. e. 
c s�s*).7 This modification assumes that successful ex-post 
smuggling is less than but approximately equal to ex-ante 
smuggling to comply with the strict concavity assumption imposed 
on the smuggling function (G). This assumption allows an 
externalization of the effect enforcement has on smuggling in the 
Pitt model. 
A Model of smuggling with Parallel Markets for 
Exports and Risk Aversion 
In all previous articles on illegal trade, except for the 
one by Scholer (1989), the trading firm had no choice with 
respect to smuggling. The assumption of parallel markets for 
exports opens up the possibility of firm choice: strictly legal 
trade or joint product export smuggling as in the Pitt model. 
This process will generate two distinct channels through which 
goods will flow. Then, it is conceivable that the law of one 
price is no longer valid inside the country. There are several 
domestic conditions which will promote the development of a 
parallel market: 1) a domestic market for the export does not 
exist; 2) all firms, by law must sell their output to the 
government; and 3) ineffective enforcement of the tax laws. 
8 
It is assumed parallel markets for exports and the risk 
associated with smuggling affect firm behavior. In illegal trade 
the risk is due to government enforcement of the export tax laws. 
The firm's decision to become involved in illegal trade, 
therefore, is based on the potential profits of smuggling and the 
uncertainty of those profits. 
Cooper (1974) alludes to a firm's "threshold of law 
abidingness, " pertaining to a "threshold tariff."8 I assume 
that the threshold export tax at which a firm will decide to 
become involved in illegal trade is determined by the uncertainty 
associated with illegal profits and the expected value of those 
profits. An export tax set above this threshold will induce 
illegal trade, as illegal gains outweigh the economic 
consequences associated with being caught breaking the law. 
It is assumed that each firm has a decision to make: the 
firm can engage in the Pitt type of smuggling or the firm can 
sell its output at the legal domestic export tax distorted price 
(Pt), pf• (l-t) = pt. If the firm decides to smuggle, it receives 
the weighted average price (P5) for its output, equation (8) 
found below. If the firm decides to stay involved in legal 
trade, then strictly legal profits for the firm can be 
represented by the variable (Y\), 
(5) Max y l i = pf. (1-t) •X - C (X, P 1) •9 
For simplicity let equation (6) represent the firm's profit 
function for strictly legal export trade, 
(6) y l i = y
l i (Pt , pl ). 
The variable (P1) is the price vector for domestic factor 
inputs used in the domestic production of exports (X) , and (Pt) 
is the exported goods tax inclusive price or full duty domestic 
price of the domestically produced exported good (X) . The 
function C (X, P1 ) is the firm's cost function, and it is assumed 
the firm is a price taker in the domestic factor markets. The 
firm's domestic export production function is assumed to be 
strictly concave and thus exhibits diminishing returns in 
production. This restriction on the firm's production function 
guarantees the firm's average cost curves are (U) shaped. 10 
The firm's expected utility of profit function for legal 
trade is assumed to be twice differentiable and is denoted 
[E (U (Yl i ) ) = u\J. Legal trade is assumed to be a risk free 
activity. 
9 
If the firm decides to become involved in joint product 
illegal trade, then its situation can be thought of as a lottery. 
The expected value of the lottery is dependent on the following 
variables, (p 1 , Y\, F1 ). The probability of apprehension (P) is 
determined by the government. The ith firm assumes its 
probability of being caught is (p,) . Each firm can influence its 
probability of success at smuggling by using cloaking activities. 
The expected value of (p) for the industry, however, is equal to 
the objective value of (p) set by the government. The variable 
(F1) is the monetary equivalent of the punishment imposed on the 
ith firm by the government if it is caught in the illegal act of 
smuggling. Fines are considered a transfer to the government. 
The variable (YS,) represents illegal profits for the individual 
profit maximizing firm, 
(7) Max YS, = pf ·G (L, S) + pf . (1-t) •L - C (X, P1 ) • 11 
10 
Equation (7) represents total profits earned if the firm is 
successful in illegal trade. Equation (7) implies that legal and 
illegal trade in exports are considered a joint product of the 
smuggling firm. The firm's ex-ante output supply price is 
determined by the weighted average of legal and illegal trade. 
The smuggler determines his average selling price of output (Ps) 
in order to calculate potential profits coming from successful 
smuggling, 
(8) ps = [Pf •s* / L+S] + [Pf • (1-t) •L / L+S]. 
For simplicity, let equation (9) represent the firm's profit 
function for successful smuggling, 
(9) Y\ = Y\ (PS , P1). 
By employing Hotelling's lemma it is possible to derive the 
output supply functions and input demand functions from the 
profit functions of legal and illegal trade, equations (10) 
through ( 13) , 
(10) aY (Ps, P 1 ) /aPs = ss c ps, P 1 ), S'>O, S">O, V ps>o, 
(11) - aY (Ps, P 1 ) /aP1 = x (Ps, P 1 ), x'<O, x"<O, V P 1>>0, 
(12) aY (Pt, P1) /aPt = Ls (Pt, P1 ) L'>O, L">O, V pt>O, 
(13) -aY (Pt, P1) /aPt = x (Pt, P1) x'<O, x"<O, V P 1>>0. 
The term (Ss) is the export supply function for firms that 
engage in illegal joint product export trade. The term (Ls) is 
the export supply function for firms that do not smuggle exports. 
11 
The expected value and variance of profit when the ith firm 
is involved in illegal trade, assuming there is not a real 
resource cost associated with smuggling, is given in equations 
(14) and (15) , 
( 14 ) E ( Y\ ) = pi • ( Y\-Fi ) + ( 1-p i ) • Y\ = Y\-Pi • F;, 
( 15) VAR ( Y\) = pi • ( 1-p i) • F
2 
i • 
The expected utility function for the firm if it smuggles, 
is assumed to be twice differentiable and is defined by equation 
(16) I 
( 16) E ( us i ) = p i • U i ( y
s 
1 -Fi ) + ( 1-pi ) • U i ( Y\ ) • 
Conditions (17) and (18) hold given that the marginal utility of 
profit is positive as defined by condition (19) , 
( 1 7 ) 8 E ( us i ) / 8 pi = U d ys i -Fi ) - U i ( Y\ ) < 0 , 
(18) 8E (Usi) /8Fi = -pi•U'i (Ysi-Fi) < O, 
( 19 ) 8 E ( U\ ) / 8 ys i = [ pi • U ' i ( Y\-Fi ) + ( 1-pi ) • U ' i ( Y\ ) ] > 0 • 
The ith firm bases its decision to become involved in smuggling 
by comparing expected utilities derived from legal profit with 
those derived from illegal profit. Therefore, the firm is faced 
with a random profit (Ysi) and a certain profit (Yu) . The firm's 
decision mechanism is based on a comparison of (Ys i) and (Y l i) , 
and this comparison is given in equation (20) , 
( 2 0) E ( ys i) - y
l 
i = 7r i • 
Applying the theoretical results pertaining to risk and risk 
aversion developed by Pratt (1964) , joint product illegal trade 
profits represent an uncertain prospect and legal trade profits 
represent a certain prospect. The term (1r1) represents the 
12 
difference between the expected value of illegal profit and legal 
profit. It follows that there does exist a (7rt = 7f;) such that 
the firm is indifferent between legal and illegal trade. The 
level of (7rt) depends on the ith firm's attitude toward risk. By 
applying Pratt's results, it is reasonable to define (7rt) as a 
risk premium. The functional form of (7r*) is given in equation 
(2 1) , 
(2 1) 7T; = (1/2) •VAR (Y
8 .)  • -{U" (Y L .) + U' (Y L .)}. 1 1 1 
By employing the standard measure of absolute risk aversion, 
R = -[U" (Y)/U' (Y)], as the measure of the ith firm's attitude 
toward risk, the following conditions arise. The value of (,r/) 
for the ith firm will be negative if (U">O) ; positive if (U"<O) ; 
and zero if (U"=O) . This implies that the ith firm prefers, 
averts or is neutral towards risk respectively. The variable 
(,rt) represents the insurance premium the firm would be willing 
to pay if it could insure itself against criminal penalties. 
Therefore, (7rt) represents the minimum level of risk premium 
necessary to induce the ith firm into smuggling. This implies 
that in equilibrium, at the margin, smugglers that are risk 
averse earn higher profits then they could in legal activities. 
Smugglers who are risk preferrers earn lower profits then they 
could in legal trade. Smugglers who are risk neutral earn the 
same amount of profits as they could in legal trade. Hence, (,r*) 
serves as proxy for Cooper's "threshold of law abidingness. "12 
Whenever (,r; > ,rt) , the firm will become involved in smuggling if 
the firm is assumed to be risk averse or risk neutral as the 
following condition implies, (U" SO) . 
13 
It is now assumed that individual attitudes toward risk vary 
among domestic firms. Let (R) be a random variable that has a 
probability density function that generates a finite variance 
distribution. Attitudes range from risk neutrality (R� O) to 
extreme risk aversion (R� �> with a lower bounded finite variance 
distribution for (R) . This assumption implies individual firms 
displaying risk neutrality or extreme risk aversion are a small 
proportion of the export industry. 
To expand on the concept of industry attitudes towards risk 
it is assumed that the expected value for the distribution of (R) 
is equal to (r, r>O) , as defined by equation (22) below. Equation 
(22) implies that the industry's average view towards the risk 
associated with smuggling is risk averse, 
(22) E (R) =0J., r·fr (r) dr = r. 
From the initial assumption of identical firms with varying 
degrees of risk aversion, the expected value and variance of 
illegal profits for the representative firm are, 
( 2 3 ) E ( Y8 ) = p • ( Y8-F) + ( 1-p) • Y8 , 
( 2 4 ) VAR ( Y8 ) = p • ( 1-p ) • F2 • 
The decision of an individual firm to continue in only legal 
trade or to engage in smuggling is based on the comparison of 
legal profits to the expected value of illegal profits earned by 
smuggling. This decision process is represented by equations (25) 
and (26) , 
14 
( 2 5) E ( Y8 ) - Y L = 1r, 
(2 6) ,r* = (1/2) •VAR(Y8 ) • -{U" (Y l) + U' (Yl)}. 
From equation (2 6) it is possible to derive (1r*) , the 
minimum risk premium at which an individual firm in the industry 
is indifferent to legal or illegal trade . The level of (1r*) 
depends on the firms attitude towards risk, which is determined 
by (R) . 
It is assumed that the distribution of the attitudes towards 
risk for all firms in the industry is given by the probability 
density function, fr (r) . The distribution of (R) is assumed to 
have a finite variance distribution for the industry. This 
implies that (1r*) also has a finite variance distribution for the 
industry and has a lower bound of zero, thus the minimum risk 
premium must always be non-negative. The probability density 
function for (1r*) can be defined as ft'* 
(1r*) • 13 
For example, assume that, on average, the minimum risk 
premium for the industry is (1rT) .  This implies that the expected 
value of (1r*) is equal to (,rT) ,  as given by condition (27) , 
* J
G * * (27) E (1r ) =0 1r • f1'. (,r ) 
Assume however, that the actual risk premium generated by 
the export tax, (1r) , is some positive value, say (1r1). Then 
there will be a set of risk averse firms involved in smuggling. 
The proportion of the industry involved in smuggling can be 
determined by the definite integral defined below, 
( 2 8) Cl = 0f T*=T1 fT* 
( ,r*) d,r* • 
15 
The proportion of the industry involved only in legal trade 
is, therefore, 





In equation (29) , the term (1-c.r) represents those firms in 
the industry for which the level of risk aversion is too high, so 
they simply do not smuggle. The variable (c.r) represents that 
proportion of the industry involved in smuggling. This implies 
(c.r) represents the proportion of exporting firms selling exports 
at an average price greater than the selling price of exports for 
firms that do not smuggle. one minus (c.r) represents the 
proportion of exporting firms selling exports at the theoretical 
full duty domestic price. Equations (28) and (29) determine the 
average domestic wholesale price of exports, equation (30) . 14 
Equation (30) represents a weighted average of trade carried out 
by the two types of firms in the industry, firms strictly in 
legal trade and the firms involved in both legal and illegal 
trade, 
(30) AWP = c.r•P5 + (1-c.r) . pt. 15 
Equations (8) and (30) demonstrate that as the export tax 
progressively increases, the price of goods exported by the 
smuggling firm declines by less than the increase in the export 
tax. This causes (c.r) to increase, causing the average domestic 
wholesale price of exports to decline by a progressively smaller 
amount than the increase in the export tax. This result implies 
that the joint product smuggling firm bears only a proportion of 
16 
the tax and the legal trade only firm bears the full burden of 
the tax. This situation forces more firms into smuggling. This 
is consistent with the empirical results of Cooper for Indonesian 
imports subject to varying tariff levels. 
This section has developed a model of industry behavior 
which allows firms involved only in legal trade to coexist with 
firms involved in joint product smuggling. The domestic average 
wholesale of exports is endogenously determined. These results 
are obtained because the decision mechanism developed in the 
model explains why one firm will smuggle and another will not. 
The methodology used in this section extended the work of 
Bhagwati and Hansen, Martin and Panagariya, and Pitt. This 
extension provides a plausible explanation for the empirically 
valid case of countries with low tariff or export tax ceilings 
experiencing little or no smuggling and countries with high 
tariff or export tax ceilings having a continuing problem with 
smuggling. 
In a recent article on import smuggling, the result of 
strictly legal traders coexisting with firms that smuggle was 
demonstrated in a stochastic model of firm behavior developed by 
Scholer (1989). Scholar assumes varying cost structures between 
importing firms and varying attitudes toward the risk associated 
with smuggling by the individual firm's management. These 
assumptions allow firms in strictly legal trade to coexist in the 
domestic market with firms that smuggle. The decision to smuggle 
in Scholer's model is based on the comparison of expected unit 
17 
cost of smuggling to the tariff and the firm's attitude toward 
the risk associated with smuggling. Scholer, however, does not 
fully develop the Arrow-Pratt methodology that would provide a 
stronger theoretical foundation for his firm's decision process. 
Another weakness of the Scholer model is the way smuggling 
cost are defined. Scholer assumes the cost of smuggling is the 
value of expected punishment, i.e., the international value of 
illegal import confiscations. The real resource cost associated 
with smuggling in Scholer•s model is generated when the 
government destroys the international value of expected illegal 
import confiscations. This is a very strong assumption, and 
Scholer notes that if this assumption is relaxed his results may 
change. 
The Welfare Effect of smuggling 
In the last section it was demonstrated that whenever 
(� > w*) for any firm or firms, a proportion of the industry 
will be involved in smuggling. The stage is now set for an 
examination of how the introduction of smuggling affects total 
exports, denoted (I). The small country assumption made earlier 
implies that the demand for exports is perfectly elastic. The 
amount of exports is therefore determined by supply. Assuming 
that the level of total exports, after the export tax is levied 
but before smuggling is introduced, is equal to xL1, 
(31) r, = xL,. 
After smuggling is introduced, the level of total exports is 
equal to the sum of legal and illegal trade, 
18 
(32) 12 = x\ + x\. 
Assuming the supply of total exports has a positive relationship 
with the price of exports, one would expect that whenever (Pawp � 
Pt) then (I2 � I1 ) : (P
8wp) represents the average wholesale price 
of exports. Given that (X\ � 0) , then X\ + X\ � I1, or 
equivalently, X52 � I1 - x
L
2• Using (31) , this implies condition 
(33) , 




1 - x\ • 
Equation (33) demonstrates that the unit volume of illegal 
trade is greater than the change in unit volume of legal trade. 
However, as in Pitt's paper, it can not be determined if legal 
trade increases or decreases because of the change in relative 
prices; thus, the effect on export tax revenues is ambiguous. 16 
The welfare effect of smuggling with parallel markets and 
varying degrees of risk aversion will now be examined. The 
analysis begins from a export tax distorted equilibrium point 
depicted in figure (1) in appendix (C) : production and 
consumption are equal to (Pt, ct) ,  and welfare is equal to (Vt) .  
The term (Vt) is an ex-post indirect social welfare function and 
is defined as [V (AWP, Y) ]. 
In the non-smuggling case, the full duty price of exports 
(Pt) is the average wholesale price of exports (AWP) . The 
variable (Y) represents income earned by the traded goods 
industry and government revenues earned from export tax revenues 
and fines collected. 17 The function (V) is assumed to be twice 
continuously differentiable and non-increasing in (AWP) and non-
decreasing in (Y) .  The introduction of smuggling is assumed to 
cause a domestic output supply price differential for domestic 
firms producing exports, (F8 >Pt) .  
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Assuming that smugglers do not incur a real resource cost 
over legal trade, the cost of smuggling is penalties and 
confiscation. The magnitude of the cost is determined by the 
fixed level of government enforcement. Therefore the aggregate 
rate of transformation in trade is the free trade terms of trade. 
Production and consumption will be equal to (paw�) and (Ca�) and 
welfare at (Va�) . The introduction of smuggling improves 
welfare over the non-smuggling situation, (Va� >  vt) as shown in 
figure ( 1) . 18 
If it is assumed government enforcement imposes a real cost 
on smuggling, as it was assumed in the earlier literature, then 
welfare levels are bounded by cvaw�) and (Vt) .  This can be 
demonstrated by first assuming the real cost of smuggling is due 
to real resources being used up in evasion or cloaking 
activities. Second, assume the expected value of punishment, 
(µ=p•F) , is used by smugglers to determine the real resource cost 
of evasion tactics. As (p) or (F) increases, the value of c s*) 
declines as (Gs) declines; thus, (F8) declines, as shown in 
equation (8) . Equations (19) and (10) imply expected illegal 
profits decline and the output from firms involved in illegal 
trade declines respectively. Therefore, the risk premium earned 
from smuggling is lower, causing the most risk averse smugglers 
to end their illegal activity. With fewer firms smuggling, the 
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average wholesale price of exports will decline and domestic 
relative prices will deteriorate, welfare will decline as a 
result of the introduction of real cost, (Vawp0 > V8wp1 ) (see figure 
1) • 
The cost of smuggling is a mix of real resource cost and 
penalties-confiscation, with legal and illegal firms coexisting 
in the domestic market. 19 Therefore production and prices are 
independent of the cost mix but are not independent of the firm 
mix. Welfare is bounded by the cost and firm mix. This implies 
that as the level of real cost imposed on smuggling by 
enforcement approaches the export tax, the risk premium earned 
from smuggling is approaching zero. As the risk premium earned 
from smuggling declines, the number of firms smuggling declines. 
As firms switch to legal trade only, the domestic average 
wholesale price of exports approaches the full duty price (Pt) .  
Once the real cost of smuggling exceeds the export tax, all 
smuggling will be eliminated. 
at (Pt, ct) and welfare (Vt) . 
Production and consumption will be 
The export tax distorted 
equilibrium will be the final result. 
The introduction of parallel markets for exports and varying 
degrees of risk aversion among exporting firms bounds the welfare 
levels associated with the coexistence of smuggling and strictly 
legal trade. The welfare boundaries are: an upper bound of 
(P8wp0, cawpO, V8wp0) and a lower bound of (Pt, ct, vt) ,  as depicted in 
figure (1) . The parallel market generates this result because 
the cost of smuggling to the firm represents a mix of a real 
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resource cost and penalties-confiscations. This cost mix is 
imposed on the smuggling firm by the government. Simply stated, 
for the smuggling firm with respect to smuggling profits, the 
cost mix is irrelevant to the firm's decision to smuggle. 
It has been demonstrated that a real cost imposed on 
smuggling by government enforcement can not reduce welfare below 
the original export tax distorted welfare level. This approach 
extends the analysis of Martin and Panagariya, Bhagwati and 
Hansen, and Pitt. The welfare results of these authors could be 
duplicated in the parallel market model by assuming that at least 
a proportion of the firms in the export industry are risk 
seeking. This assumption produces the ambiguous welfare result 
arrived at in the earlier literature. Therefore, it is the overt 
or implied assumption of the exporting firm's attitude toward 
risk generating the ambiguous welfare results found in the 
earlier literature.� 
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The Welfare Effect of Govermaent Enforcement 
The welfare analysis of smuggling in the economic literature 
has ignored the interaction between government enforcement and 
illegal transactions. 21 However, the Bhagwati and Hansen result 
of "the less smuggling the better" implies that government action 
should be taken against smugglers. 
For the purpose of simplifying the analysis of this 
interaction, assume that government enforcement effort can be 
increased without any significant increase in cost. The 
government agency responsible for the enforcement of the export 
tax laws and reducing smuggling has three policy instruments at 
its disposal. First, it can increase enforcement activity to 
increase the probability of apprehending smugglers. Second, the 
government can increase the penalty for smuggling. Third, the 
government can lower the tax on exports. Based on the earlier 
results that smuggling reduces the negative welfare effect of the 
export tax, the welfare effect of changing each policy instrument 
is examined below. 
The result of increasing the tax on exported goods in the 
parallel market model causes a decline in expected profits for 
smugglers and a decline in profits for firms involved in legal 
trade only. This counter intuitive effect is the result of a 
fixed international price for the small country's exports and the 
smuggling firm producing a joint product for export. Equation (7) 
demonstrates that for a fixed level of domestic production the 
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smuggling firm's successful smuggling profit level declines when 
the export tax is increased. 
Equation (8) demonstrates, however, that the decline in (Ps) 
will be less than the decline in (Pt). This implies that the risk 
premium earned from smuggling, (•), will increase and induce 
more firms to smuggle. Total exports will decline, but the 
smuggler's market share will increase. This is what Cooper calls 
"the secondary effect": "With competition from smuggling of any 
type, what appears to an indirect tax, the export tax, becomes a 
direct tax on the income of he who pays it, for he can not pass 
it on to his customers. 1122 The result of (Ps) declining by less 
than the increase in the export tax in the parallel market model 
is consistent with Cooper's empirical result of the domestic 
average wholesale price of imports increasing by less than the 
increase in the tariff. 
Increasing government enforcement activity increases the 
probability of being caught in the illegal act of smuggling. As 
demonstrated in equations (14) and (17), increasing the 
probability of apprehension reduces expected profits and expected 
utility of illegal trade. This causes the number of firms 
involved in illegal trade to decline. Therefore, the welfare 
effect of an increase in the probability of apprehension is 
negative with respect to the results of the previous section. 
If government enforcement is able to raise the probability 
of apprehension to one, illegal profits would equal (Ys-F) for 
firms involved in illegal activity. Firms would then base their 
24 
decision on whether to be involved in legal or illegal trade on a 
simple comparison between (Y5-F) and (Y t) .  Government could then 
eliminate illegal trade by setting the monetary penalty high 
enough so that (Y l) > (Y8-F) , for all firms. On the other hand, 
if government set (p=O) , and if (Y1 > y t) ,  then all firms will 
smuggle. In this situation, assuming perfect competition and no 
real cost incurred in smuggling, the country would attain a free 
trade equilibrium. 
An increase in the monetary penalty (F) for firms caught in 
illegal trade lowers the expected profits and expected utility of 
profits for firms involved in illegal trade, as demonstrated in 
equations (14) and (18) . Therefore, the number of firms involved 
in illegal trade decline. Thus, the welfare effect of an 
increase in the monetary penalty is negative with respect to the 
earlier results of this essay. 
Setting the monetary penalty at zero would eliminate legal 
trade and bring about a free trade equilibrium, if (Y1 > Y 1 ). 
Setting the monetary penalty at infinity would eliminate all 
illegal trade. The export tax distorted equilibrium would be 
attained, if the probability of detection is non-zero. 
The welfare results arising from a change in government 
enforcement in the parallel market model are in sharp contrast to 
the ambiguous welfare results found in the earlier literature. 
In the parallel market model, as the real resource cost increases 
from increased enforcement, risk averse firms begin to switch 
from illegal to legal trade. With this assumption incorporated 
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into the model, increased enforcement has an unambiguous negative 
welfare effect. Government not only affects expected profits 
from smuggling, but also imposes an increase in real cost on 
smuggling that is reflected in the smuggling function (G) . Once 
the increase in real resource cost associated with smuggling 
becomes greater than the extra revenues earned from smuggling, 
all smuggling will end, if (U"<O) . 
Another interesting issue concerning government policy and 
smuggling is which policy tool is most effective in reducing 
smuggling. Extending the research of Becker (1968) , the 
effectiveness of (p) and (F) in reducing the amount of smuggling 
depends on the attitude toward risk of the traded goods industry. 
Equations (34) and (35) below are elasticity measures for the 
expected utility of illegal profits with respect to the policy 
instruments (P) and (F) , 
(34) -BE (U) /Bp • p/U = {U (Y5 )- U (Y5-F) } • p/U, 
(35) -BE (U) /BF • F/U = p • U' (Y5-F) • F/U. 
It is possible to use equations (34) and (35) to determine 
which government policy instrument is most effective in reducing 
smuggling. A direct comparison of equations (34) and (35) , 
results in condition (36) . It is now possible to perform an 
algebraic manipulation to arrive at condition (37) . Condition 
(37) demonstrates that the individual relative effectiveness of 
the enforcement policy instruments is contingent on the attitude 
of the traded goods industry toward the risk associated with 
smuggling, (U" > o, u" = o, u" < O) , 
> 
(36) {U (Y8 - U (Y8-F)} • p/U � p • U' (Y
8-F) • F/U, 
(37) {U (Y5) - U (Y5-F)} / F 
Equation (37) reveals that a one percent increase in (p) 
generates a larger percentage reduction in smuggling than a one 
percent increase in (F), if the traded goods industry has a 
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preference for risk. This occurs because the decline in expected 
utility from smuggling profits is greater from the increase in 
(p). If the traded goods industry is risk averse, then a one 
percent increase in (p) generates a smaller percentage reduction 
in smuggling than a one percent increase in (F). 
The above analysis has produced a very interesting result 
with regards to policy instrument choice. Assume that 
clandestine smuggling is carried out by non-risk averse criminal 
elements in a society. Assume the type of smuggling that uses 
under-invoicing, under-assessment and false declaration is 
carried out by risk averse legitimate firms. If increased use of 
policy enforcement instruments has a zero or equal cost, 
government could then choose the instrument which is most 
effective against the type of smuggling most prevalent in its 
economy. 
One other comparison can be made. The elasticity measure 
for the expected utility of illegal profit, equation (38), with 
respect to the export tax is greater than the elasticities of the 
enforcement policy instruments, 
(38) -8E (U)/8t • t/U = {-p•U' (Y8-F) • dy/dP8 • dP8/dt -
(1-p) • U' (Y5 ) • dy/dP8 • dP5/dt} • t/U. 
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The comparison of equation (38) to equations (34) and (35) 
demonstrates that reducing the export tax by one percent 
generates a larger percentage reduction in smuggling than does a 
one percent increase in government enforcement. This result holds 
if it is assumed, (U" SO). 
Sheikh (1990) used a variant of Tobin's (1958) portfolio­
selection risk model to investigate smuggling. The mean-variance 
methodology allowed Sheikh to reexamine the theoretical results 
of the smuggling literature, and he concludes that all existing 
models over predict the possible positive welfare effects of 
smuggling because the introduction of risk lowers welfare by its 
mere presence. Sheikh's model, however, does not provide an 
explanation for the coexistence of strictly legal firms with 
smuggling firms in the domestic market. He does, however, 
demonstrate that when smugglers are risk averse, increasing 
punishment is more effective in controlling smuggling than 
increases in the probability of detection. I arrive at the same 
result in equation (38) by using the Arrow-Pratt methodology to 
model the risk associated with smuggling. 
The mean-variance approach has several weakness that were 
not addressed by Sheikh. The literature on "choice under 
uncertainty" reveals that generally the mean-variance approach 
will not be able to reproduce the "true" rankings of the complete 
distributions generated by the expected utility hypothesis 
approach. 24 The mean-variance approach, when used to model the 
risk associated with smuggling, will only produce suitable 
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approximations to the expected utility approach under one of the 
following conditions: 1) risks are small in some sense; 2) the 
distribution of smuggling profits must be normal; 3) the 
smuggling firm's utility function is quadratic. Sheikh's mean­
variance model fails to make the necessary assumptions to meet 
any one of these three conditions. 
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Summary 
The purpose of this essay is to extend the analysis of 
Bhagwati and Hansen and other economists working on the welfare 
effect of illegal transactions. This essay's analysis began with 
the construction of the parallel market model for export 
smuggling. The results of the model are as follows: 1) the 
coexistence of legal and illegal trade in the domestic market for 
exports is possible when a domestic price differential exists; 2) 
smuggling is welfare enhancing, irrespective of the real resource 
cost associated with it, or smuggling will end: 3) increased 
government enforcement against smuggling has an unambiguously 
negative effect on welfare and smuggling market share: 4) the 
relative effectiveness of enforcement instruments is dependent on 
the risk preference of smugglers; and 5) the ambiguous welfare 
results attributed to smuggling in the earlier literature are the 
direct consequence of not addressing the risk issue associated 
with smuggling. 
The basic conclusion of the essay for most situations is 
that smuggling is desirable over non-smuggling. The basic policy 
conclusion for lesser developed countries is clear. Lesser 
developed countries should not rush into a policy of eliminating 
smuggling without considering other courses of action. 
Otherwise, they may inflict a welfare loss upon their economies. 
Appendix (A) 
The profit maximization first order condition for equation 
( 5) is, 
(la) ay L;ax= pf . c1-t) - C/ = o .  
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The profit maximization second order condition for equation 
( 5 )  is, 
c 2a) a2Y;ax2 = -c/ < o . 
The second order condition for profit maximization holds for 
the legal trade only exporting firm under the assumption that the 
domestic export production function for the firm is strictly 
concave and therefore the firm has an upward sloping marginal 
cost curve, (C/ > 0) . Under the assumption that second order 
conditions given in equation (2a) hold, the legal trade only 
firm's profit function represented by equation (6) is well 
behaved. 
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Appendix (B) 
The profit maximization first order conditions for equation 
(7) are, 
(lb) 8Y/8L= pf . cl + p
f . (1-t) - Cx' = O, 
(2b) 8Y/8S= pf . cs - Cx' = o. 
The profit maximization second order conditions for equation 
(7) are, 
( 3b) 82Y/8L2= pf• G - C ff < 0 LL x I 
( 4b)  a2Y/ 8L8S= pf• GLS - C/ < 0 , 
(sb) a2y;as2= pf · G - c ff < o SS X I 
(6b) a2y;asaL= pf . csl - c/ < o. 
The partial derivative (Gs) is the marginal product of ex­
ante smuggling in production of successful ex-post smuggling and 
is assumed to be positive. The partial derivative (GL) is the 
marginal product of legal trade in production of successful ex­
post smuggling and is assumed to be positive. The partial 
derivative (Cx' > is the marginal cost of domestic export 
production and is assumed to be positive. The second order 
partial derivatives (G86 ) and (GLL) are assumed to be negative 
because of the strict concavity assumption imposed on (G) . The 
cross partial derivatives, (GsL ' GL8) ,  are assumed positive and 
small. This implies that the marginal productivity of either 
input increases if the other input is increased. The second 
order partial derivative (Cxff > represents the slope of the firm's 
marginal cost curve for domestic export production and is assumed 
to be positive because of the strict concavity assumption imposed 
on the exporting firm's production function for the domestic 
production of exports. The second order conditions for profit 
maximization hold when it is assumed that the cross partial 
derivatives are positive and small, and it should be noted that 
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it is assumed that changing (L) or (S) implies the production of 
exports (X) must increase. 
(7 b) A = 
Pf • G -c II LL x 
pf · G -c II SL X 
pf • G  -C " Ls x 
pf • G  -C " SS X J , DET (A) > O. 
Under the assumption that second order conditions given in 
equation (7b) hold, the smuggling firm's profit function 
represented by equation (9) is well behaved. 
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Appendix ( C )  
Figure ( 1 )  
EXPORTS 
V 
awp 1 . 
T IMPORTS 
The symbols ( T ,  T)  represent the production possibi l ities 
front ier for a sma l l  country . The vari ables ( P f , cf , Vf ) 
represent the free trade equ i l ibrium posit ion for the sma l l  
country . The variables ( Pt , ct , vt } represent the non- smuggl ing 
tax distorted equ i l ibrium posit ion for the sma l l  country . The 
variables ( Pawpo , cawpo , vawpo) represent the smuggl ing equil ibrium 
position when smuggl ing does not incur a rea l  resource cost over 
lega l trade and strictly legal trade is coexi sting with j o int 
product il legal trade . The symbo l ( B )  represents the inferior 
aggregate rate of transformation curve for smuggl ing when 
v awp 
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smuggling incurs a real resource cost greater than legal trade . 
The variable ( Q8 ) represents the share of the export market that 
joint product smugglers control. Strictly legal trade will  take 
equilibrium consumption to (Cawp1 ) . Equilibrium domestic relative 
prices and welfare are (F8wp1 ) and {V8wp1 ) respectively. The welfare 
rankings for the different scenarios is clearly demonstrated in 
figure (1) . 
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End.notes 
* ·  I wish to thank Donald Coes, Robert Gillespie, Earl Grinols, 
Stan Herren, and the two anonymous referees for their comments. Any 
remaining errors are my responsibility. 
1. An implicit assumption of the Bhagwati and Hansen model is that 
the real cost of smuggling is equal to the tariff. 
2. See Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) , p. 172. 
3. See Cooper (1974) , pp. 188-189. 
4. Pitt (1981) provides empirical evidence of price disparity 
occurring in the Indonesian domestic market for commercial rubber. 
5. Deardorff and stolper (1988) and Cooper (1974) argue that 
smuggling may not impose a real cost on society. 
6. The real resource cost may take the form of special packing 
costs necessary to hide smuggled goods. It could also come from 
shipping goods out of or into clandestine ports to avoid detection. 
7. We appeal to the arguments presented against an excessive real 
resource cost associated with smuggling in the articles by Cooper 
(1974) and Deardorff and stolper (1988) for this assumption. 
8. See Cooper (1974) , p. 190. 
9. The cost function is assumed to be twice differentiable, and 
cost minimization is assured by the assumption that the firm ' s  
production function for the domestic production of exports is 
strictly concave. The first and second order conditions for profit 
maximization are given in appendix (A) . 
10. The cost function for the firm is assumed to represent the 
minimum production cost associated with a specific level of output 
(X) • The cost function embodies the assumption of strict concavity 
of the firm ' s  production function and therefore produces (U) shaped 
average cost curves for the domestic export producing firm 
regardless of whether the firm smuggles or not. This assumption 
assures an interior maximum exists for the firm ' s  profit function. 
11. The first and second order conditions are given in appendix 
(B) . Note that X = L+S. 
12. See Cooper (1974) , p. 190. 
13. It should be noted that as the expected value of (R) for the 
industry increases, the expected value of c�*) for the industry 
will also increase and therefore the number of firms smuggling must 
decline. 
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14. I shall assume that each exporting firm has equal weight in 
determining the domestic average wholesale price of exports . 
15 . Pitt (1981) , p. 450. 
16. Pitt (1981) , p. 454 . 
17. It should be noted that fines will be zero in the non-smuggling 
case. 
18. The mathematical model developed here examines export 
smuggling ; however, the geometry used in figure (1) applies equally 
to import and export smuggling in a manner analogous to the 
symmetry results demonstrated by Lerner (1936) for import and 
export taxes. 
19. The real resource cost of smuggling is the excess cost 
incurred over legal trade and is due to the cloaking activities 
employed to hide illegal activity from government enforcement. 
20. This point was made by Sheikh (1990) . 
21. The literature assumes government enforcement is constant. For 
example, see H. G. Johnson (1974) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (197 3) . 
22. Cooper (1974) , page 190. 
23. Becker (1968) , used a similar approach in his analysis of the 
economics of crime . ,  p . 11. 
24 . For a discussion of this problem with the mean-variance 
approach, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1987) , pp. 395-405. 
